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LAW, NATURAL LAW, AND HUMAN
INTELLIGENCE: LIVING THE CORRELATION
Patrick McKinley Brennan'
"'Of Law there can be no less acknowledged,
than that her seat is the bosom of God,
her voice the harmony of the world.""
I. WIT AND THE NATURAL LAW, THE QUARTUM QUID
We are created "to serve [God] wittily, in the tangle of [our] mind[s],"
Sir Thomas More declares in Robert Bolt's play A Man for All Seasons.2
More began his adult life of service of God in the self-imposed silence of
the London Charterhouse, and that same life was ended for him, of
course, in the isolation of the Tower of London and through the violence
of Tower Hill, on account of a self-imposed silence of different
inspiration. Between Charterhouse and Tower, Thomas More was as
cunning as a serpent to use what considerable wit he could muster to
serve God, Church, family, and state, including through law. More was
"perhaps the greatest lawyer and administrator of his generation,"
Steven Smith observes in his essay Interrogating Thomas More: The
Conundrums of Conscience.3 And, as Professor Smith goes on to explain
there, during the long interval between his two silences, More dedicated
himself to working as a lawyer, in hope of ensuring that his state and his
Church would continue to work together in and for the truth.4 The work
ended as the second silence became necessary because of the state's
demand, in the name of its law, that More do what he could not do in
truth. Never was the legal regime to which More was a leading
contributor pure; never was it wholly fixed on the polity's serving God in
* John F. Scarpa Chair in Catholic Legal Studies and Professor of Law, Villanova
University School of Law. For the kind invitation to participate in this symposium, I am
grateful to William Wagner and Brad Lewis. Another debt of gratitude runs to Joseph
Vining and Steven Smith, not just for comments on this paper but for years of
conversation regarding the relationship between law's and our own possibilities. I thank
Laura Henderson and Justin Heminger of The Catholic University of America for their
exemplary shepherding of this paper and Ed Heffernan of Villanova for his superb
research assistance.
1. A. P. D'ENTREVES, NATURAL LAW 154 (2d rev. ed. 1970)
2. ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 74 (Heinemann Educ. Books Ltd.
1960).
3. Steven Smith, Interrogating Thomas More: The Conundrums of Conscience, 1 U.
ST. THOMAS L.J. 580, 581 (2003).
4. Id. at 608.
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the truth; never has mankind been the beneficiary of a fully worked out
jurisprudence. In doing what he could through the law of a state that was
basically but imperfectly respectful of the truth about human living in the
divine plan, the Saint understood himself to be serving God wittily. He
prayed for as much, knowing that the minds we have are tangled, the
world in which we are given to serve, knotty.
Law's Quandary is a profound and sagely worded inquiry into what we
are-or should be-up to in the name of law. Through a probing
dialectical analysis of the relationships between our legal practice and
our justificatory apparatuses, the book drives the reader to ask, perhaps
for the first time in earnest: "Where in the world is the law for us?" Not
content with the Legal Realists' diet, but clear-sighted about the doubts
that have been aired concerning doing law "the old-fashioned way,"
Steven Smith is led to wonder whether we are capable of law anymore.
Law's Quandary occupies a place in that small circle of works in
jurisprudence that could actually matter to our living.
I consider the gravamen of Law's Quandary to be, first, that many of
the terms, operative presuppositions, and practices by which we act in the
name of the law today are out of alignment with the "ontological
inventories" that we (or many of us) are willing (and sometimes proud)
to own, and, second, that, therefore, (frequently) when we talk or act in
the name of the law, we commit "nonsense." Nonsense, as Smith intends
the term, is what one gets when one treats as real things that do not
appear on one's ontological inventory, one's list-implicit or explicit-of
that which exhausts the real.' Law as we practice it, Smith contends,
depends upon a baroque ontology that includes realities denied by
today's academic metaphysicians and, at least on state occasions, by
many of law's practitioners and theorists; above all, as practiced today,
law still looks to a "higher law," of which the quotidian statements of law
are said to be merely evidence. Swift v. Tyson6 was overruled and is
officially discredited (Judge Posner is sure that Swift was based on an
"epistemological error" 7); according to Smith, however, its
jurisprudential commitments live on in today's practice. The proposition,
which Swift uttered and applied, that our statements of law are more or
less adequate approximations of a higher law, Smith captures under the
label the "classical view," and he finds this view, though widely
5. STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY 13-14 (2004) [hereinafter SMITH, LAW'S
QUANDARY]; see also Steven D. Smith, Nonsense and Natural Law, in AGAINST THE
LAW 100, 100-03 (Paul F. Campos et al. eds., 1996).
6. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
7. Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987,
100 HARV. L. REV. 761, 763 (1987).
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repudiated by a century of theorists, persistently at the heart of today's
practice.
Having found an impressive incongruence between law's metaphysical
assumptions and commitments and its practitioners' ontological
inventories, and having found, therefore, a lot of nonsense on the loose,
Professor Smith asks whether the generators of all this nonsense should
be diagnosed with "bad faith," and a peculiar strain of bad faith at that.
Unlike the pastor who has lost his faith but retains a desire to inhabit the
parsonage (and therefore pretends for all to see that the god still exists),
the bad faith practitioners of law Professor Smith observes both regularly
invoke and rely on law's metaphysically robust terms and deny those
terms' validity or truth. In Smith's own words:
[T]hey persist in the practice while denying its ontological
presuppositions. They avow belief in the practice, that is, but
not in the metaphysical premises that seem necessary to support
the practice. Or, to shift to the religious vocabulary, if
contemporary law is a species of idolatry ['the continuation of
God by other means'], it is a peculiar and confusing sort of
idolatry in which the devotees regularly deny that the idol has
the transcendent qualities it would need to justify the uses they
make of it.8
The perversity of this apparent "bad faith," this operative self-
contradiction-that is, law's practitioners' actively undermining the very
practice in which they are engaged-leads Professor Smith to propose
another possible diagnosis:
[A]though lawyers and judges might be in bad faith when they
engage in the practice of law, their overall behavior seems more
consistent with the hypothesis that the self-deception occurs
when they engage in explicit theorizing about law-and when in
the course of such theorizing they deny the metaphysical
commitments that they in fact hold.9
Having sketched this second possibility-that the testimony of our
performance is more probative than that of much of our theorizing-
Professor Smith backs away from its possible implications, indicating that
if we agree with him we shall be left choosing as he does "between
speaking nonsense or . . . standing in silence."' Stranded in an
"ontological gap" between what conditions law's performance
presupposes and regnant ontologies that deny the satisfaction of those
conditions, the question remains whether we who are born late are
8. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY, supra note 5, at 164.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 179.
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capable of law. Smith answers, in part: "'Nonsense' describes a sort of
intellectual dereliction, or a miscarriage of cognition and articulation; but
it does not necessarily signify an inability to function."" Still, Smith finds
himself and others in a position of perplexity, and the book ends as
follows:
Perplexity is not a resting place, to be sure, and it is
uncomfortable (as some of us can attest) to have to be
constantly choosing between speaking nonsense or just standing
in silence. So we will surely continue, as Socrates did, to seek to
enhance our understandings, or to fill in our ontological gaps.
But in the meantime-and we look to be in the meantime for
quite a while-and on the Socratic premise that "it is the most
blameworthy ignorance to believe that one knows what one
does not know," we would perhaps be wise to confess our
confusion and to acknowledge that there are richer realities and
greater powers in the universe than our meager modern
philosophies have dreamed of."
The iconic More whom I sculpted at the outset suggests a starting point
for an answer to Smith's quandary. First, understand what it is to
understand-understand, that is, what it is to be "witty," by which More
meant not funny, but intelligent in your knowing and responsible in your
acting, 3 and you will be on your way to understanding how to meet life's
possibilities and demands, including through law. Second, take our
successful performances in law as a guide to how to be witty in human
living. "'[Llaw is evidence of view and belief far stronger than academic
statement and introspection can provide,""14 as Joseph Vining says in
language Smith himself quotes in exploring the possibility that we or
many of us are "tacit neoclassicists."'" Not long ago, I overheard a radio
commercial assert: "Even the law of gravity is just a suggestion," this as
part of an advertising pitch for an upcoming "lawless broadcast."
Happily, I was not around when that broadcast issued; more happily,
even citizens listening to such broadcasts seem generally to obey the law;
and this because most people in this country, philosophically
impoverished and benighted though we may be, do not treat the
Constitution of the United States and the laws made in pursuance
thereof as mere suggestion, although it needs to be added right away
that, first, our collective living by them remains a choice and, second,
11. Id. at 21.
12. Id. at 179 (footnote omitted).
13. See 20 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 468 (2d ed. 1998).
14. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY, supra note 5, at 171 (quoting JOSEPH VINING, FROM
NEWTON'S SLEEP 5 (1995)).
15. Id. at 170.
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some phases of living by these laws involve the coercion of the sheriff
(and when sheriff arrives, law has in some sense already failed). To my
mind, the evidence that is what we do in the name of law mercifully saves
us from having to suppose that people mean many of the things that get
said today, even or especially in the philosophy of law. Our (relative)
success in doing law cannot be wholly undone by talk that is sometimes
cheap and philosophies that are always in need of improvement. To
serve God wittily, in the tangle of our minds, is at least an honest day's
work, in law.
Law as we ordinarily speak of it is a tool, a tool not to the hand or to
the eye only, but principally to intelligence in search of worthy human
living, living, that is, that is good for us. In what we do in law, the object
of our intelligence is the good. Talk about the good is out of fashion in
jurisprudence, of course, and many attempts to implement the good
through law are outlawed by the (non-binding) rules of political
liberalism. I, however, understand the good to be ineliminably the
central aim, justification, and exigence of what can be done in the name
of law, even-mirabile auditu-in this pluralist democracy of ours. In the
words of St. Thomas Aquinas in his Commentary on the Nicomachean
Ethics of Aristotle: "the end of politics is the human good,', 16 and law is
the tool, first, of the person(s) who has (have) charge of the political
community and, second, of those whom he (or they) rule. It is in the
nature of law to aim for the good of those whose rule of living it would
be, and neither Aristotle nor his commentator makes an exception for a
people who have decided to rule themselves democratically. If the goals
sought in and through "law" fail to be good for us, and to the extent our
"legal" means of implementing worthy goals are wrongheaded, what we
are up to falls short of law, at least where "law" is understood as
something to be obeyed (rather than merely complied with as a matter of
calculation and strategy). If we cannot adjudge actions taken in the
name of the law as somehow contributing to what is genuinely good for
us humans, then, as Francis Cardinal George observes, we cannot but
experience such intrusions upon our self-direction "as an unintelligible
restraint.''17  How could it be otherwise? How can we intelligent
creatures be obligated (as opposed to "obliged") to what is not good for
us? "Remove or forget the Good and law inevitably becomes legalism." 8
16. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, IN DECEM LIBROS ETHICORUM ARISTOTELIS AD
NICHOMACHUM EXPOSITIO para. 29, at 8 (Raymundi M. Spiazzi ed., 3d ed. Marietti
1964).
17. Francis George, Law and Culture in the United States, 48 AM. J. JURIS. 131, 146
(2003).
18. RUSSELL HITTINGER, THE FIRST GRACE 28 (2003).
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In suggesting that law as we ordinarily speak of it is a principal tool in
the project of realizing the human good, I do not blink the fact that in its
decadent forms "law" can be a lot less, and is so in the hands of certain
lawyers, law professors, and judges in every generation, and perhaps
especially in our own. What Flannery O'Connor observed will remain
true: "[I]n us the good is something under construction,"19 and we are
always obligated (and obliged) to carry that work forward the only we
can, which is wittily, in the tangle of our minds. Neither the fact of
pluralism nor a normative commitment to democracy renders law that is
not good for us better than the aforementioned "unintelligible restraint."
Law that is correlative to our human nature is intelligible to us, and our
intelligence finds in it reason to follow it. The tradition has referred to
such law as the natural law, a correct understanding of which will be
instrumental to dissolving quandary in the vicinity of law and getting on
with the work of constructing the good.
But first I would anticipate an objection. I have heard it said, in the
name of the United States' commitment to democracy, that "God applies
the natural law."2° In the memo I received, however, it was and remains
we who are to be its implementers-this at our individual and collective
peril, for what the natural law requires, as I think, is that we seek and
instantiate the good for us and avoid what is not good for us.
Implementing the natural law is a rather low-flying business, you might
then say-and in a way, that will be the point. Though, quite
appropriately, the texts that the authorities in this republican democracy
create in the name of the law-think of the Administrative Procedure
Act of 1946 and the judicial opinions that give it effect today-do not
talk the language of the good, these linguistic tools of ours are the
workings out of the specialized conceptual and analytical devices that are
productive of worthy human goals, e.g., a rational and fair administration
of state assistance to the needy. Assuming a certain set of facts, this is
the implementation of the natural law, and it's eminently bread and
butter. However, and at the same time, such implementation of the
natural law is also our human glory, a participated theonomy (as John
Paul II called it in Veritatis Splendor),21 freely to choose and make
effective God's law for us and, thereby, to come to our perfection by
19. FLANNERY O'CONNOR, INTRODUCTION TO A MEMOIR OF MARY ANN (1961),
reprinted in FLANNERY O'CONNOR: COLLECTED WORKS 830 (Sally Fitzgerald ed., 1988).
20. Antonin Scalia, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, The Common Christian
Good, Speech at the Gregorianum University Symposium on Left, Right, and the
Common Good (May 2, 1996) (transcript available at http://www.learnedhand.com/scalia.
htm).
21. POPE JOHN PAUL II, THE SPLENDOR OF TRUTH: VERITATIS SPLENDOR para. 41,
at 57 (Vatican trans., St. Paul Books & Media 1993) (emphasis omitted).
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instantiating in ourselves and our communities the goods of our human
nature.
Sadly, the good never surfaces in Law's Quandary, at least not quite,
and this fatal failure of the good to emerge, I shall argue, is the
consequence of the author's elision of the classical position on law. As I
read the book, Professor Smith adumbrates this (false) trilemma: either
getting along with "law" that respects nothing higher than itself (though
continuing to talk the talk of higher law); or "the classical position," that
is, somehow conforming to an "overarching" "ontological order;" or
Socratic perplexity. Judging the first to be nonsense, and finding the
second to be currently unavailable, Professor Smith is driven to the third
horn of his trilemma. I shall respond to the trilemma by proposing a
quartum quid that is neither nonsense, nor the classical position as
Professor Smith understands it, nor perplexity. The proposed rescue
comes in what Smith overlooks in the classical position, as I receive it: If
we are to serve God wittily, indeed, if we are to observe the natural law
as the classical position understands it, we must first get to know
ourselves: the way to the good and back to God is through mastery of
the natural means God has given us. Christian believers affirm that
supernatural grace, too, plays a part in this, of course, and the details of
grace's how matter; but for purposes of the current analysis, I am going
stipulate to St. Paul's assurance as to the Lord's assurance: "My grace is
sufficient for thee." God has created and called us, and thus made it
possible for us, to serve him wittily, in the tangle of our minds. Through
our wit we are given to discover and implement in our living the natural
law that God has promulgated in our very selves. Thus, to begin to
decipher my title, what will be law for us neither exceeds nor fails to
meet our human intelligence: the two must be in a living correlation. In
additional language that Smith quotes from Joseph Vining: "'[T]he
question of what the law "is" is not so very different from the question of
what we "are..,,,,,23
II. SITUATING THE NATURAL LAW
A. Giving Natural Law the Slip
Most of the questions of law that our courts are called upon to decide
are pretty meat and potatoes, thank God. An example that comes to
mind is whether without the consent of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania probation officers employed by the Commonwealth could
22. 2 Corinthians 12:9.
23. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY, supra note 5, at 173 (quoting VINING, supra note 14,
at 128).
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sue the same in its own courts for alleged violation of the overtime
provisions of the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. The
24Supreme Court's answer, given in the 1999 decision Alden v. Maine, is a
resounding no. Because such a suit would be inconsistent with the
"sovereign dignity" of the Commonwealth, the Court explains, the law
does not allow the suit.25 But how do the Justices know this? On what
basis do they make this statement of law? Is it possible that the natural
law itself gives an answer to the question presented? This latter course
certainly is not the one the Court claims to have pursued; indeed, Justice
Kennedy's opinion for the majority vehemently denied the dissent's
accusation of natural lawyering, although it is worth noting in passing
that the picture of natural law developed by Justice Souter in dissent
bears scant relationship to natural law as it has generally been
understood in the central tradition.26
Whatever the true basis of the Alden decision (to which I shall return
briefly, at the end), the possibility of a world in which judicial officers
decide the disputes before them by consulting the natural law directly,
and without any mediating statements of law or evidence of law, is worth
pursuing for the light it sheds on Professor Smith's treatment of the
classical position. If the natural law included answers to such questions
as the one presented in Alden, and if the judges in fact consulted the
natural law and followed it in their deciding, then this hypothetical legal
regime would satisfy anti-Austinian aspiration to "a rule of laws, not of
men." The natural law, however, has never been thought by its
proponents, so far as I am aware (and its detractors are another story,
which I'll address in a moment), to include answers to such questions as
whether the Congress of the United States in the year [x] can compel a
state [y] to adjudicate a claim for money damages based on federal cause
of action [z].27 But what if we ask the question at a level of greater
abstraction? On the classical position, does the natural law determine
whether citizens should be able to sue their state for damages caused by
the agents of the state?
On the natural law, Law's Quandary is signally sparse. I say
"signally," because in a book that teases with the possibility that the
classical position might be the way to go (if only we could), the natural
24. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
25. Id. at 715, 727.
26. Id. at 795-98 (Souter, J., dissenting) (attributing natural lawyering to the
majority).
27. On Aquinas's view, determinationes are contained in the eternal law, but not in
the natural law. See ST. THOMAS AQuINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, at Pt. I-IT, Q. 91, Art.
3 (3d. ed. San Paolo 1999). On the relationship between the eternal law and natural law,
see infra Part l.B.
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law should be conspicuous not by its reservation. Natural law constitutes
the core of the classical position on how we mortals are to structure and
judge law and politics, but I am not sure that the phrase "natural law"
appears at all in the text of Law's Quandary; though it does appear in a
footnote , there it is advanced as a synonym for "law of nature," which
29does appear in the book's index, while "natural law" does not. In the
end, I am not sure that the concept of the natural law, as understood in
the classical tradition, is present in Law's Quandary at all, and it is this
omission/suppression, I would suggest, that makes the classical position
seem so remote as to be unapproachable. Can it be a surprise that
omission/suppression of the law that is correlative to our human natures
leads to perplexity and quandary?
It is worth watching carefully how the omission/suppression occurs.
Professor Smith starts by identifying legal practices of ours that treat
judicial decisions (and maybe even statutes and the Constitution itself) as
evidence of what "the law" is, rather than as the law itself. These
practices of implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) affirming a higher law
to which human decisions and enactments must conform (if they are to
be law), Smith suggests, are living remnants of the aforementioned
classical view, which view Smith then proceeds to associate with such
great names in the English legal tradition as Coke and Blackstone.
Whereupon Smith proceeds immediately to observe: "Perhaps the most
systematic working out" of this "worldview . . . . had been performed
30centuries" earlier, on the Continent, by Thomas Aquinas.
Explicating what he takes to be Aquinas's position, Smith explains that
"human or positive law derives from the 'eternal law,' which is the
divinely ordained order governing the universe, and positive law gains its
status as law by virtue of participating in that order.",3 1 Smith continues,
quoting Aquinas:
"Since then the eternal law is the plan of government in the
Chief Governor," Aquinas explained, "all the plans of
government in the inferior governors must be derived from the
eternal law." And it followed that "every human law has just so
much of the nature of law as it is derived from the law of
nature. ,32
28. See SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY, supra note 5, at 185 n.12.
29. Id. at 204-05.
30. Id. at 46.
31. Id. (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).
32. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE I-
II, at Q. 93, art. 3, Q. 95, art. 2, reprinted in THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF ST. THOMAS
AQUINAS 34, 58 (Dino Binongiari ed., 1953)).
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It is at this point that Smith drops the footnote that mentions the
"natural law." Glossing the just-quoted language of Aquinas's Summa
Theologiae, Smith explains: "The 'natural law' or law of nature is that
part of the eternal law that is accessible to human reason without the aid
of divine revelation., 33 With this gloss in place, Smith rounds out his
summary of Aquinas's position on human law's relationship to higher
law by quoting Thomas's admonition that "'if in any point [the human
law] deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion
of law."'3
Smith next anticipates "[a] possible misconception, which leads to a
familiar and dismissive caricature, [that] must be guarded against here.
The classical position as expounded by thinkers like Aquinas," Smith
continues, "did not naively suppose that there is, say, a sort of ghostly
Internal Revenue Code in all of its magnificent detail written in the
heavens, and that the Code we find in our more terrestrial tax volumes is
merely a mundane photocopy of the celestial original., 35 Because we live
after Holmes and his 1917 installation of the "brooding omnipresence in
the sky" caricature of the natural law,36 this is a salutary point of
clarification. On the genuine classical position, according to Smith:
A few legal rules, such as the prohibition of homicide, might be
derived directly from-"read off of," as we say-the eternal
law. But the overwhelming bulk of positive law consists of the
detailed specification, or determinatio, of what the eternal law
gives only in generalities. Such specifications are the product of
judgments by human legislators, whose pronouncements have
the status of law. Even so, the legal status of such
pronouncements depends on their indirect derivation from the
eternal law, and they should be understood and interpreted in
accordance with that overarching reality.37
The important positive point that Smith makes here, against the
caricature, is that, on the classical view, most of the particular decisions
or rules implemented by human legislators are humanly-wrought
determinationes, that is, determinations or specifications of matters left
indeterminate and unspecified by higher law. There may be some people
who once believed, and there certainly are great jurists who said, that the
whole body of human law is found, not made; but by now, as Mary Ann
33. Id. at 185 n.12.
34. Id. at 46 (alteration in original) (quoting AQUINAS, supra note 32, Q. 95, art. 2,
reprinted in THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 58 (Dino Binongiari ed.,
1953)).
35. Id. at 47.
36. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
37. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY, supra note 5, at 47.
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Glendon says, "[N]o American adult needs to be told that we live under
a rule of men in the sense that laws are made, interpreted, and
administered by real men and women. '38 This is as it should be, but from
this it does not follow that those with responsibility for governing the
political community through law are not obligated by (even if, alas, they
ignore) a natural law.
The wrinkle in Professor Smith's analysis, I think-and it is a wrinkle
that once pressed into the fabric of the analysis leads irresistibly in the
direction of the false trilemma-concerns our human connection, so to
speak, to law not of our making. Before proceeding further I should be
perfectly clear that, although I am following Professor Smith's sound lead
in turning to the texts of Aquinas for an indication of the classical
position, for me, as for Professor Smith, the issue is not exegesis of
Aquinas, but instead an alleged quandary caused by our tergiversating
abandonment of the classical stance. On my reading, to the extent
Aquinas indicates the classical position (and if Aquinas does not, then
who does?), we confront a more layered legal world than Smith allows,
and it is in the missing layer that, for better or worse, we've always lived,
because that is the level on which we are given to live. Professor Smith is
I think right that many have lost their jurisprudential moorings, but I
conclude that Professor Smith misses an essential link in those moorings
as they have classically been (and might still be) conceived. To borrow a
line from the late legendary San Francisco columnist Herb Caen, things
aren't as good as they used to be, and they never were.
B. Our Participation in the Eternal Law
Turning to some particulars, Professor Smith is correct that the
classical position as expounded by Aquinas denies that anything is a law
that is not derived from the eternal law, a point Thomas makes by
quoting St. Augustine approvingly: "[Iln temporal law there is nothing
just and lawful, but what man has drawn from the eternal law."3 9 Smith's
explication of the "eternal law" as "the divinely ordained order
governing the universe"4 is fine as far as it goes, but it does not go far
enough. On Aquinas's account, the eternal law just is the divine mind
providentially governing all of creation to its proper and common goods,
the bona propria and the bonum commune. That governing providence
takes one form in respect of nonrational beings, a form appropriate to
their lack of freedom to do otherwise. With respect to rational creatures
and the human person in particular, God's governing providence is in the
38. MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 10 (1994).
39. AQUINAS, supra note 27, at Pt. I-I, Q. 93, Art. 3.
40. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY, supra note 5, at 46.
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nature of a rule that can be obeyed (or disobeyed). "Now among all
others, the rational creature is subject to Divine providence in the most
excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by being
provident both for itself and for others. 4 '  The human person's
participation in the eternal law just is the natural law. 4' As promulgated
in every human person, the natural law orders the person toward his or
her proper goods and toward the common good; as beings created with
reason and freedom, it falls to us by the divine plan to implement (or
not) God's law for us, and that law is the natural law.43
Law's Quandary never gives us the natural law as classically
understood; indeed, in the text of Aquinas glossed by Smith in the
aforementioned footnote, in which Smith identifies the natural law with
the "law of nature," the translator (not Smith) has misleadingly rendered
Aquinas's "lex naturalis," that is, natural law, as "law of nature." Lex
naturalis is not a mere metaphorical periphrasis for "nature" or nature's
statistical regularities.44 On Aquinas's analysis, the providential God has
promulgated a law in (and for) us, a prospect wholly absent from the
cosmology bequeathed by Aristotle to Aquinas; the whole thrust of
Aquinas's thought as concerns law, lex, is to work out providence as an
ordinance of reason in God's mind that goes forth in his rational
creatures for their acceptance in freedom, thus leading them to their
proper and common goods. In saying in a footnote gloss that "[t]he
'natural law' or law of nature is that part of the eternal law that is
accessible to human reason without the aid of divine revelation, 45 Smith
occludes the fact that there is a genuine law, which we are supposed to be
following, that is promulgated right here within our very selves. To
direct us toward an "overarching reality" is to direct us away from the
very site of the promulgation of the natural law; it is, in a way, to turn us
against our better selves.
Before saying more about getting to know the natural law and what it
might mean for legal practice and jurisprudence today, I should say that
behind Professor Smith's otherwise puzzling obnubilation of the natural
law lurks, I sense without knowing, a healthy fear of much of what is said
41. AQUINAS, supra note 27, at Pt. I-II, Q. 91, Art. 2.
42. For an elaboration and analysis of the doctrine of "participation" in Thomas's
metaphysics of law, see Craig A. Boyd, Participation Metaphysics in Aquinas's Theory of
Natural Law, 79 AM. CATHOLIC PHIL. 0. 431 (2005).
43. For a contemporary attempt to retain the classical position but without God and
the eternal law, see ANTHONY J. LISSKA, AQUINAS'S THEORY OF NATURAL LAW 116-38
(1996).
44. See HITTINGER, supra note 18, at xxvi, 7. Occasionally, Aquinas does write lex
naturae where one would expect lex naturalis, but his meaning remains clear and
unchanged. See, e.g., AQUINAS, supra note 27, at Pt. I-I, Q. 95, art. 2, at 961.
45. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY, supra note 5, at 185 n.12.
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today in the name of natural law. On Aquinas's analysis, it bears
emphasis, natural law is truly law: Aquinas defines law as an "ordinance
of reason," promulgated by the person (or persons) charged with care of
the community, for the common good.46  At the law's source is a
reasoning promulgator, and the law just is an ordinance of reason. In
many contemporary expositions of the natural law, by contrast, the so-
called natural law's properly legal character has seeped (or been
squeezed) out. In some iterations, for example, one finds instead human
practical reason ungoverned by law; other times one finds natures that
are "laws" unto themselves, a reinvigoration of the "law of nature" idea
that, as I mentioned, Aquinas sought to domesticate to God's
47providence. On the classical position, by contrast, law's conditions are
satisfied neither by self-generated norms of practical reasoning (about
human nature) nor by natures themselves: Law in the proper sense is in
mind, not in things-first in the mind of the lawgiver, then in the minds
of the governed. Make no mistake about it: On the classical position of
Aquinas, there is simply no law without a (reasoning) promulgator,
lawgiver, legislator.48
C. Living the Natural Law
I turn now to a brief survey of the important terrain eclipsed in (and
productive of) Law's Quandary for what it can contribute to what we do
today in the name of the law. An accurate grasp of the classical line will
have practical implications for a response to the second half of Law's
Quandary, to which I turn in Sections III and IV. These appear only
once one looks down from the illusory heaven of an overarching reality
to begin to discover the legal reality here below.
According to the classical position, in promulgating the natural law,
the divine legislator works through human nature itself; our participation
in the eternal law occurs through our given natures, and on two levels.
On one level, we humans participate in the eternal law simply by our
being directed to specific goods by our created nature; God's law for us is
present in us naturally through inclinationes toward our goods, not just
any inclinations but those inclinations that have (in the phrase of Jacques
46. AQUINAS, supra note 27, at Pt. I-I, Q. 90, Arts. 1-4. For contrasting views on
how much of Aristotle's cosmology of nature Thomas retained, compare WALTER
ULLMANN, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT: THE MIDDLE AGES (rev. ed. 1970),
with HARRY U. JAFFA, THOMISM AND ARISTOTELIANISM (1952).
47. For an analysis of examples, see HITTINGER, supra note 18, at 46-50.
48. On the natural law as law, see id. at 39-62, JEAN PORTER, NATURAL AND DIVINE
LAW 156-64 (1999), and Stephen L. Brock, The Legal Character of Natural Law
According to St. Thomas Aquinas (1988) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Toronto) (on file with author).
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Maritain) "passed through the lake of Intellect (functioning
unconsciously)., 49  Man's directedness to his goods rises up into
intelligence, and this is natural law on its first level. Then, on the second
level, "men and women" (as Pamela Hall explains) "also partake in the
eternal law by their knowledge and choice: (1) they must recognize
certain inclinationes as normative, as ordering them toward specific
goods; and (2) they must discover and choose the means by which they
can achieve the goods to which they are so directed."5 ° There are goods
toward which humans are directed through certain of their inclinations,
and these they are obligated to try to discover; furthermore, they are
obligated to find and select the means by which they can instantiate these
goods. "To be instructed in the natural law, we must engage in a kind of
practical reasoning that is itself both self-education and self-discovery,"
explains Pamela Hall."1 She continues:
Natural law is not a theoretical knowledge of propositions;
rather, it is a possession of ends and of ways of discovering
means to those ends. Our discovery of the natural law occurs
by way of reflection upon our natures and then by discovery of
the necessary means for achieving or constituting the goods of
our natures. These means include the formation of rules to help
secure and constitute the good for us. We both give the law to
ourselves and discover it.52
There are two interrelated claims here: First, the human person's goods
are given, the rule for his living is promulgated in his nature through
inclinations that rise up into intellect; second, the person's freedom is to
discover those goods and the means for implementing them. The human
person's participation in the divine providential ordering governance is
free: We must use our created intelligence to discover the natural law
and the means of its implementation. Hall thus continues:
Only by the free exercise of our practical rationality could we
discover the natural law..., and this discovery would involve in
part doing over again the work of the first legislator, God. In
that sense, God first manifests his providence through the
eternal law (in which natural law participates), and so directs all
creatures to himself. Just so, men and women imitate (and yet
49. JACQUES MARITAIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF MORAL
PHILOSOPHY 54 (Cornelia N. Borgerhoff trans., Magi Books 1990). For a compendious
treatment of Maritain's application and development of the Thomist position on natural
law and the good, see Patrick McKinley Brennan, Jacques Maritain (1882-1973), in I THE
TEACHINGS OF MODERN CHRISTIANITY ON LAW, POLITICS, AND HUMAN NATURE 75-
114 (John Witte Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., 2006).
50. PAMELA HALL, NARRATIVE AND THE NATURAL LAW 37 (1994).
51. Id. at 29.
52. Id. at 37 (footnote omitted).
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obey) divine providence by directing themselves in discovering
and pursuing their good. They follow divine providence by
being provident for themselves."
It is by getting to know ourselves, then, that we get to know the natural
law, and implementing the natural law means achieving or constituting
the given goods of our nature. The reality is not overarching: It is
within, not as a predicate of our human nature, but rather as God's
regulating addition. Russell Hittinger notes:
The radical implications of Thomas's teaching should be
evident. Every created intelligence not only has a competence
to make judgments, but to make judgments according to a real
law-indeed, a law that is the form and pattern of all other laws.
Thus, the legal order of things does not begin with an acquired
virtue, possessed by a few; nor does it begin with the offices and
statutes of human positive law; nor does it begin with the law
revealed at Sinai. God speaks the law, at least in its rudiments,
to every intelligent creature.5
If, then, we serve God, we do so wittily, in the tangle of our minds, under
law.
And this leads me to emphasize a crucial point frequently neglected by
the tradition and of surpassing significance to dissolving the quandary in
Law's Quandary: The discovery of the natural law promulgated within us
takes place "within a life, 5 6 the life of an individual but, more
efficaciously, in the life of a whole community (or community of
overlapping communities), over time and not all at once. Each of us
holds the first principles of the natural law in that mental habitus
Aquinas calls synderesis, but these are only a beginning, starting points.
Every individual's success in implementing the natural law turns in part
on the antecedent and concomitant success of the community in creating
means for discovering and implementing the natural law. We do not go
it alone, or at least we should hope that we don't have to try to do so.
And although prophets, saints, and reformers make their mark at
decisive moments in history, the ordinary way by which the natural law
enters human living is through individuals' forming and subordinating
themselves to communities that embody effective means of discovering
and implementing the natural law, always attentive to need for self-
correction if the construction of the good in us is to go forward according
53. Id. at 38 (footnote omitted).
54. Another source of learning about the content of the natural law is the divine law,
both old and new, which God promulgates because of the infirmity of our fallen capacities.
See id. at 45-91.
55. HITrINGER, supra note 18, at 98.
56. HALL, supra note 50, at 37.
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to the natural law. Among the means that ordinarily serve the entrance
of the natural law is positive law, with the authorities it presupposes. The
entrance of the natural law into lived history is the controlling goal; the
means of its entrance are for humans to work out through trial and error,
as to which more in a moment.
Although Professor Smith rightly rules out the celestial Internal
Revenue Code model of the classical view, its Platonic shadow slips back
in, I fear. Professor Smith's version of the classical position is misleading
and incomplete because it does not set out the particular given means by
which we naturally participate in the eternal law: practical reason
discovering and implementing the natural law. It is not a matter of
somehow conforming to an "overarching reality"; rather, it is a matter of
progressive and cumulative practical insight into the law promulgated
within ourselves. To be sure, many moderns find even this halfway
house too much to swallow, but my point is that there exists an
intermediate position and it speaks to how God governs us here and now
toward our goods. It is the classical position as Aquinas developed it and
as we might appropriate it; not mysterious conformity to an overarching
reality, not knowledge of propositions, not a work of theoretical reason,
but, rather, an imitation of divine providence through discovering and
giving the natural law to ourselves. On this view, the making effective of
natural law in history depends on our growing in self-knowledge and
implementing means of making the law for us effective. An individual's,
a community's, a culture's growth in knowledge of the natural law takes
time, must be cumulative and progressive, and must meet changed
circumstances. It was for this reason that Jacques Maritain could make
the otherwise perhaps startling observation that it is the essence of
political absolutism and tyranny for the terrestrial lawgiver to be subject
to no law other than the natural law.57 Instructively, Maritain's rejection
of rule directly according to the natural law occurs in the context of his
rejection of claims on behalf of political "sovereignty," a point to which I
shall return in concluding.
III. TEXTS IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR LEGAL PRACTICE
I have suggested how the particular way in which the classical position
(as set out by Aquinas) subordinates man to a law not of his making
leads proximately to the human person's being subordinated to
community and its authority. This point wants more development, and it
will receive some here as my angle of analysis now shifts to track
Professor Smith in the prosecution of Law's Quandary. At the beginning
of Part III of the book Professor Smith turns from the question whether
57. JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 31 n.12 (1951).
[Vol. 55:731
Living the Correlation
higher law is necessary to law as we ordinarily practice it, to the
significance of the quotidian texts we use in this legal practice of ours.
"Forget the last two chapters," Professor Smith invites the reader, for
after all, it is texts - not "the law" - that ordinarily receive our attention
when we are looking to make a statement of law, and some people go
nearly so far as to say that the law is only what is written down.58
Consideration of the "questions lawyers ask every day . . . will
eventually," Smith predicts, "lead us around to approximately the same
underlying issues that we have already been considering .... The central
inquiry for this part of the book is: How does law mean?, 59 What follows
in the next two chapters is a tour de force of contemporary legal
hermeneutics and a devastating critique of those theories that would find
"meanings without authors." I shall agree in the main with Professor
Smith's conclusion as to how we should read texts in law, but my reasons
for reaching this conclusion follow from the account of natural law I have
just given, not solely from the nature of language or semiosis as such.
There is no mystery about why texts are created and given focal
attention in what we do in the name of law. Memories are weak, and
even the best tend to fade; and paper barriers, though not weighty in the
way sticks and stones are, have the capacity to communicate (inter alia)
what those who came before learned (or failed to learn) about how
humans can implement the natural law. Texts created as contributions to
our efforts to become lawful free the generations from having to reinvent
the wheel, though of course they do not-because they cannot-free the
generations from the personal and communal obligation to continue the
construction of the good. Every moment of life is a fresh opportunity,
indeed exigence, to continue to implement the natural law; if we are not
implementing the natural law, we are not instantiating the goods
commanded of and offered to us. Writings can help us in this process of
implementing the natural law, but writtenness is not in the essence of
law, as evidenced by tle natural law and the eternal law; indeed, as
already indicated, the point is the stronger one that law, strictly speaking,
is only in reason, in intellectu. But though law is not strictly speaking
"in" the writings, it is our practice-from our written Constitution right
on down-to turn to texts in aid of making statements of law. But to
which texts do we turn? And in search of what do we turn to them?
An analogy may help get the analysis started. In the Catholic
tradition, there was (and in some quarters there still is) a way of doing
theology that came to be caricatured as "Denzinger theology." This
method of theology takes the epithet by which it is known from the name
58. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY, supra note 5, at 97.
59. Id.
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of the German, Heinrich Denzinger (1819-1883), who in 1854 assembled
a thick book of quotations of conciliar and papal pronouncements.
Denzinger's tome begins with a text from the second century, and the
current, i.e., the fortieth, edition of the book brings the reader not only
through Vatican II but also through a quarter century of the pontificate
of John Paul II.60 Denzinger's name remains on the book today, and
names the theological method of using texts from the book (or in general
of using snippets of texts) as undated, context-less nuggets to be adduced
and rearranged while the adducing and rearranging theologian neither
adds nor subtracts intellectual content. The irony is apparent that, in a
tradition that understands the indispensable value of tradition, tradition
has been supplanted by iteration and reiteration.
One way of elaborating the widely acknowledged defect in this method
of doing theology is that it does not stop to ask what the drafters of the
quoted language meant. Bernard Lonergan catches the problem in his
observation that "one has only to peruse such a collection of conciliar
and pontifical pronouncements as Denzinger's . . . to observe that each is
a product of its place and time and that each meets the questions of the
day for the people of the day."61 The texts came into being thanks to
authorities trying to meet the issues and solve the problems of a
particular people, in a particular time and place; and what could be
better than meeting the questions of the day for the people of the day?
But the people who come later are different and they have questions of
their own (though of course they may be very similar). If in meeting the
questions of today someone would derive help from the learning of
yesterday, he must understand what was said yesterday. Inasmuch as the
texts handed down and selected afresh by us are answers to questions,
then to understand them, we need to know the questions to which they
are the answers. The Denzinger theologian does not have or make time
for this inquiry; he reduces texts to authorless propositions in need of as
much interpretation as the black squiggles on the pages of Euclid's
Elements, and then boldly reissues them with a meaning of his own
imposition, his signature supposedly nowhere there (except in the
invisible ink). It's not rocket science that we can impose whatever
meaning we like on whatever texts we can adduce. But if we are not
asking what the authors meant, if we are not looking for the intelligence
communicated through those words, there is no good reason to look at
those words rather than other words (or any words at all). In any event,
by failing to look for the intelligence (or lack thereof) in what was
60. HENRICI DENZINGER, ENCHIRIDION SYMBOLORUM DEFINITIONUM ET
DECLARATIONUM DE REBUS FIDEI ET MORUM (Helmut Hoping & Peter Hunermann
eds., 40th ed. 2005).
61. BERNARD J.F. LONERGAN, METHOD IN THEOLOGY 296 (1972).
[Vol. 55:731
Living the Correlation
written down, the Denzinger theologian has cut himself loose from the
possibility of learning.
The de-authoring error that I have just been describing is compounded
by another that is related: The Denzinger theologian forgets what
Denzinger himself knew, to wit, that a selection was made among
available documents. Denzinger prefaced his book of nuggets with
methodological notes on the "selectio documentorum" and the "valor
documentorum"; he knew that he had made selections and he judged that
the documents had various strengths. But for those who use Denzinger's
volume the way one would use the Periodic Table of the Elements, the
universe is closed and all its members are created equally elemental. No
one quite defends this method of theology, of course, but those eager to
shore up, or sew up, the faith tradition and community are apt to slide in
this direction, concretizing a canon that is and should be the tradition's
work in progress. Should be, because the people whose tradition it is
have fresh questions (else they are moribund or dead). I am fond of
quoting David Tracy's observation that "when literate cultures are in
crisis, the crisis is most evident in the question of what they do with their
exemplary written texts. '62 We cannot stop history "by the rules," but
that hasn't stopped people's trying.63
With this in mind, I wish to return to what we do in law, and ask how
much it resembles what the Denzinger theologian is up to. Though my
answer will provide what I take to be a good and sufficient reason for
agreeing with Smith that we should read texts in law for their semantic
intentions, it is, as I say, a reason that Professor Smith will probably not
accept. To the extent that the true locus of law lies in an overarching
reality, signification about the natural law and the means of its
achievement will not measure up.
In law we turn to texts alright, but there is no universal-Denzinger to
tempt us. No one has done the work of selection for us. There remains
the seduction to suppose that the list of texts that can be consulted is
capped, but that temptation, strong though it be, usually gets resisted
when push comes to shove. Edmund P. Morgan's classic 1944 statement
of the judge's responsibility vis-A-vis the law brings into bold relief the
openness of the inquiry and its source in the responsibility of the judge to
be lawful:
In determining the content or applicability of a rule of
domestic law, the judge is unrestricted in his investigation and
conclusion. He may reject the propositions of either party or of
62. DAVID TRACY, PLURALITY AND AMBIGUITY 11 (1987).
63. See Patrick McKinley Brennan, Political Liberalism's Tertium Quiddity: Neutral
"Public Reason," 43 AM. J. JURIS. 239, 249-50 (1998) (reviewing MICHAEL J. WHITE,
PARTISAN OR NEUTRAL: THE FUTILITY OF PUBLIC POLITICAL THEORY (1997)).
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both parties. He may consult the sources of pertinent data to
which they refer, or he may refuse to do so. He may make an
independent search for persuasive data or rest content with
what he has or what the parties present. He may reach a
conclusion in accord with the overwhelming weight of available
data or against it.... In all this he is entitled to the assistance of
the parties and their counsel, for he is acting for the sole
purpose of reaching a proper solution of their controversy. But
the parties do no more than to assist; they control no part of the
64
process.
By the time he renders judgment, the judge must be able to say what the
law is, and the process available to him allows him to "make the
assumption a fact." 65 This does not commit one to judicial infallibility; it
simply acknowledges that the court cannot stop trying to get it right, even
as further reflection reveals that the court failed in the last case. The
question of constitutionality was not briefed in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tomkins,66 but overrule Swift v. Tyson the Court did nonetheless, in part
on the basis of "the more recent research of a competent scholar"
(which, of course, would before too long be discredited by still newer
learning).67 Stare decisis is the sound judicial practice of standing on
what can and should be stood on, not a supposed natural-law mandate
for entrenching error or overruling all decisions that were originally
erroneous. It is instructive that no Supreme Court Justice has taken the
position that initially incorrect constitutional precedent should no matter
what be overruled.68 What will be "right" may have altered, and so too
the judicial office. What judges do in the name of the law, as opposed to
what they say in that name, shapes itself to the life in which the natural
law is to be implemented. 69
I began by speaking of the judge's relationship to the law because we
think we know more or less what it is in his office to do (or forbear to
do). But the judge's office or role is what it is not because of a Platonic
Form, but because of its more or less defined place in an overall effort in
which he has his particular part to play. A practitioner of law looking to
make a statement of law, as advocate before bench or as counselor to
client, will look to all the available evidence. What that evidence is, he
64. Edmund M. Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARV. L. REV. 269, 270-71 (1944)
(footnote omitted).
65. Id. at 271.
66. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
67. Id. at 72; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 634-35 (5th ed. 2003).
68. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 113 (2001).
69. See Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71,159 (1928).
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will have to determine for himself, though the tradition in whose overall
community effort he plays a part will help. As I argued above, unless it
be a dead tradition (which, again, is no tradition at all), it will have built
into its core methods for meeting the questions of the day for the people
of the day, and this will include the possibility of self-correction and
growth (and insulation against invasion by the domestic barbarian). In a
word, it will do what raises the probabilities that the wheel of law and the
body politic will not only turn, but also roll along.70 That is how the
natural law gets implemented, the human good constructed in history.
Guidance for making selections and then determining which texts are
to be perused, and which are to be scanned or rusticated, is derived from
the inquiring mind's goal. Ex hypothesi he is aiming to make a statement
than can be enforced on behalf of the community and obeyed by the
community's members. If the Talmudically-slouched soul seeking to
make such a statement of law happens to be a judge, he is such because,
as I have indicated, the community has created offices (of which his is
one) and endued their holders with power to govern the community
toward its and its members' goods and goals. As Aquinas has it, the
judge is, duplex servitus, a twice-measured servant: measured first by the
natural law as all people are, then also by the positive law of the
community in virtue of his office. Though it would be a trespass upon
the common good for him to usurp more authority than he has been• 71
given, this fact does not settle how much authority he was, or should be,
given (e.g., state court judges and federal court judges hold different
powers-a fact systemically overlooked, by the way, by Ronald
Dworkin). Whatever the particular parcellings out of office, however, in
any human community you can conceive of, tradition remains the
crucible of discovery of the natural law and the means of its
implementation; as we saw in Part II, the discovery and implementation
of the natural take place within the life of a community. The community
that is the state derives its legitimacy, as all communities derive their
legitimacy, from being basically committed to seeking and implementing
the good. In looking to evidence from the past, the legal community's
judge will be looking for what intelligence about human living can be
found there, looking for what minds who confronted similar problems
and goals in the past passed along and down in their writings. Some of
these go to a community's particular and unique emphases and goals, its
determinationes; others give straightforward temporal effect to perennial
principles of the natural law.
70. On the place of method in law, see Patrick McKinley Brennan, Law and Who We
Are Becoming, 50 VILL. L. REV. 189, 199-201 (2005), and Patrick McKinley Brennan,
Realizing the Rule of Law in the Human Subject, 43 B.C. L. REV. 227, 277-83 (2002).
71. See HITTINGER, supra note 18, at 100-03 (discussing Aquinas's position).
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And this then, at last, is why I think Professor Smith is so right that the
semantic intentions of the author just are the "legal meaning., 72 Texts
are worthy of our attention as part of the project of guiding and
structuring human living to the extent that they are the intelligible and
intelligent communications of other persons engaged in the collective
construction of the good. We look to the texts in law as the
communication of intelligence about living, because intelligence (as a
capacity) is what we have, and intelligence (as the product of the
successful use of that capacity) is what we are after. Texts by
unintelligent authors should be marginalized; those by witty souls should,




for how the tradition shifts priorities among texts, but I can submit that
the justifying goal of letting the natural law enter assures that we must be
looking to those texts for what intelligence they communicate. We could
look to the texts for palindromes instead, but that would be no
contribution to law; elite tile is no rule by which to live.
Now, the principal opposing position holds that instead of looking for
the author's meaning through the text, we should turn to the text but
then give it somebody else's-or nobody's?-meaning. This is what the
Denzinger-theologian-turned-lawyer does: He proceeds to try to solve
the problems of the day for the people of the day without looking for the
intelligence in what has come down from the past. By substituting for
the author's intent a "meaning" constructed from statistical probabilities
of meaning (which is all that lexicons and grammars can record), he cuts
himself off from the potential sources of transmitted wisdom. He might
get lucky for a while, and indeed he probably will, because chances are
high, as Professor Smith observes to a somewhat different purpose, that
the speaker's meaning will coincide with the ordinary meaning.74 But
over the long run, the history that I read shows that the cultures that
succeed writ large are the ones that succeed by writ small creating
effective methods for cumulatively and progressively discovering and
implementing the good. The trouble with identifying legal meaning with
something other than the semantic intentions of the author or authors is
not that doing so is incoherent; it's just that it loses the traction necessary
for law, that is, its being calculated to pass on and correct intelligence,
leading to the progressive and cumulative entrance of the natural law
into human living. It becomes that "unintelligible restraint," a blunt
intrusion upon intelligence's possible scope.
72. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY, supra note 5, at 101-25.
73. VINING, supra note 14, at 75.
74. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY, supra note 5, at 145.
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Given my agreement with Professor Smith on the identity of legal
meaning and semantic intention, I should go on to ask whether I am
saddled with what he refers to as "the problem of authors."75  The
apparent problem is that having concluded that the legal meaning of
texts just is the semantic intentions of their authors, in order to follow the
law we shall need to know collective semantic intentions. Here I shall
just record that I agree with Smith's case for the in principle possibility of
a legislative intention, and also with his estimation of the frequency with
which it occurs. 76 A consequence of the large size of the population of
our legislative branch makes getting to know the mind of the lawgiver
difficult. But the difficulties judges and others encounter in getting to
know the lawgivers' semantic intentions do not properly operate to
supplant the lawgiver's meaning with someone else's, at least not without
sub silentio usurping the lawmaker's office. The difficulties of
interpreting the Decrees of the Council of Trent are not thought, except
by the Denzinger theologian, to dispense the interpreter from the job of
grasping the meaning the hundreds of enactors intended in their
enacting. To put this point as it concerns law in its strongest form:
because law just is an ordinance of reason, law's only locus is reason-
first that of the lawmaker(s), then that of one(s) ruled (both citizens and
judge). It is only in a very extended sense of the term, that is, per
similitudinem,7 7 that law can be said to be "'in' . . . the law books, the red
[traffic] light, [and] thd physical flow of traffic itself."78 This just is the
consequence of law's being an ordinance of reason-hence the need to
serve wittily, in the tangle of our minds.
The difficulties of living by this fact about law's being in reason move
Professor Smith to look for that hypothetical author whose semantic
intentions are easier to get a handle on, and, like the imaginary friends
we may have had as children, they are indeed very approachable; their
problem is that they're pushovers. In the alternative, we can hypothesize
a Hercules, but he turns out to be too superior to be reachable, and is
therefore utterly unhelpful. On good and sufficient ground Professor
Smith declares the search for an adequate hypothetical author a failure,
whereupon he "revisits" the classical account to see whether it might
offer help. Here Professor Smith concludes that if (but only if) we could
be like our forebears and believe in the eternal law of God, we might be
on our way to getting out of the quandary in which he finds us.79 But by
way of conclusion I should like to suggest that the problem is not so
75. Id. at 126-53.
76. Id. at 135-43.
77. AQUINAS, supra note 27, at Pt. I-II, Q. 91, Art. 3.
78. HITTINGER, supra note 18, at 96.
79. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY, supra note 5, at 152, 174-75.
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much a failure of belief, as it is a failure of intelligence, a failure to be
witty.
IV. LIVING THE CORRELATION
Let me begin to move toward a conclusion by asserting again that God
does not implement the natural law, at least as "natural law" is
understood in the classical tradition: It falls to us freely to implement the
law God has promulgated in us. Jacques Maritain makes the point
sharply:
Men know [the natural law] with greater or less difficulty, and
in different degrees, running the risk of error here as elsewhere.
...That every sort of error and deviation is possible in the
determination of these things merely proves that our sight is
weak and that innumerable accidents can corrupt our judgment
.... All this proves nothing against natural law, any more than
a mistake in addition proves anything against arithmetic. 80
If before reading what I have written here you were not already disposed
to affirm the existence of the natural law governing us humans, and
therefore the obligation to use practical reason to continue to discover
and implement that law, nothing I could say in this compass would
change your mind. The point I wish to highlight, however, is that, alike
for those affirming the natural law and those vilifying the same, failure to
implement the natural and thus become the good that we can be is a
sadness for which there is no terrestrial balm, an insight given
memorable-to-the-point-of-haunting expression by Pascal:
Man is a mere reed, the weakest thing in nature; but he is a
thinking reed. The entire universe need not arm itself to crush
him; a vapour, a drop of water, is sufficient to cause his death.
But if the universe were to crush him, man would still be nobler
than his destroyer, because he knows that he dies, and also the
advantage that the universe has over him; but the universe
knows nothing of this.81
If man chooses to let the universe or that "trend... in recent centuries
called democracy" 82 get the better of him, by doing what is against the
natural law, he has no one but himself to blame. God may forgive him,
but that would do nothing to undo the ontic harm done. One is either
instantiating the good or one is not, and that is the end of the matter so
80. JACQUES MARITAIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND NATURAL LAW 62-63 (Doris C.
Anson trans., Charles Scribner's Sons 1949).
81. BLAISE PASCAL, PENStES 110 (Louis Lafuma ed., John Warrington trans., J.M.
Dent & Sons Ltd. 1960) (1670).




far as this life is concerned. Loving creator, redeemer, and sanctifier that
He is, God did not promulgate the natural law so that we might then
discover the higher law of democracy on which to impale ourselves.
Still, nothing in the classical position entails that one participate only in
a legal regime that fully conforms to that natural law. Sed contra. The
natural law is never fully known, therefore never fully implemented; it
remains Flannery O'Connor's good "under construction"83 in each
individual and in every society. But, because individuals need society
and thus political authority to begin to reach what the natural law
commands, it follows that obedience to a particular government's
authority will ordinarily be a person's first instance of obedience to law.
Thomas More for a time subordinated himself to the statutes of the
Carthusian Order and later to the laws of England; it was to the natural
law directly that More conformed when the authorities acting in the
name of the "law" of England (that was in truth no genuine law at all)
left him no honest alternative. More, as you will recall, advised against
chopping down all the laws, imperfect though he realized they were; this
because he knew them to constitute the matrix in which lay most
people's opportunities to live decent and worthy lives. Most of the time
our obligations are to obey the law, and to contribute to its betterment as
our office-judge, citizen, legislator, or even law professor-allows.
Law, though, is never the whole of the human picture: it operates in a
complex dialectic with the larger culture. "'Culture' broadly understood
is the world that people in a given society make by what they do and why
they do it. . . . 'Culture' . . . reflects and is shaped by people's
understandings of meaning . . . value," 4 and what is real. Law's
Quandary confronts a world in which lawyers and practitioners continue
to talk a talk that the culture denies, at least in large part. Thus, another
observation of Cardinal George's is material: "Law contributes
massively to the formation of culture; culture influences and shapes law.
Inescapably, inevitably, law and culture stand in a mutually . .
reinforcing relationship., 85 In the world Professor Smith has illuminated
for us, the culture undermines the possibility of law. But the path that
Professor Smith shies away from, and thus declines to irradiate, is that
law, to the extent that we can and do continue to do it basically right,
demonstrates to our society that the entrance of the natural law is
possible. The fact proves the possibility; the fact does not leave us
perplexed. I do not deny, indeed I agree that we must insist, that the
83. O'CONNOR, supra note 19, reprinted in FLANNERY O'CONNOR: COLLECTED
WORKS 830 (Sally Fitzgerald ed., 1988).
84. Francis Cardinal George, Law and Culture, 1 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2003)
(footnote omitted).
85. Id. at 9.
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current incongruence between our theories and our practice creates
societal problems, including some bad laws and their consequences. But
I should also insist that our philosophies are not the final measure of our
performance. The question is what performance remains possible or
exigent. The eternal law is unchanged; the natural law is unaltered by its
desuetude. We can and must continue to implement the natural law
despite the nonsense in the air. At the limit, we may have to follow More
into silence, but More shows us how far distant that limit may lie.
Human practical reason giving effect to the natural law is a powerful
tool. We have to overcome the tangles in our minds, to be sure; and
frequently, if in fits and starts, "we" have. Mary Ann Glendon has
observed of the common law that it was a working model of such reason,
and particularly in its built-in capacity for self-correction and thus
progressive and cumulative growth. 6 Professor Smith, in a part of Law's
Quandary that I can only mention, resists characterizing what we do in
law as an exercise in practical reason. I resist this resistance because
either law is an exercise in practical reason or it is an utterly reasonless
enterprise (because, obviously, it is not an exercise in pure theoretical
reason). Practical reason discovering and implementing the natural law
is the engine we have, and perfect carburetion is not to be expected.
That, as Professor Smith observes in this vein, the common law method
sometimes fails in its techniques and particular aspirations is no more an
argument against its being an exercise in practical reason than those
mistakes in addition are arguments against arithmetic. We need to use
practical reason better in order to make our specifically legal methods
better, and certainly the wild growth in statute law, and in administrative
statutes in particular, provides new challenges in terms of the
particularizations of method that we need. We need a common law
method for the age of statutes. There is real work to be done here, and
its success is contingent upon our resisting the lure of enacted law whose
democratic pedigree is said to dispense us from the obligation to
implement the natural law. Anticipating anxiety in response to what I
have just asserted, I repeat that the judge's usurping more authority than
he has been given works a trespass upon the common good; it's just that,
first, judges should be given what authority is necessary if the natural law
is to be implemented in the here and now, and second, if the judge
cannot reach a just judgment because he is properly duplex servitus, he
must stand back rather than push ahead.
Particularly in his cautious introduction of Professor Vining's
contributions, but also elsewhere in the book as well as in his Believing
86. Mary Ann Glendon, Knowledge Makes a Noisy Entrance: The Struggle for Self-
Appropriation in Law, 10 LONERGAN WORKSHOP 119, 126-29 (1994).
87. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY, supra note 5, at 92-96.
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Living the Correlation
Like A Lawyer,'8 Professor Smith suggests that what is necessary if we
would return to the classical position is that old standby, the "leap of
faith." Faith is indeed, as Avery Cardinal Dulles has written, "the
Christian word,"89 and I am all for it-until, along with hope, it is no
longer needed because charity reigns. But, speaking of hope, I hope that
I shan't scandalize by concluding that we needn't vault any broad, ugly
ditch to do law the way it should be done. There may now obtain a
hobbling rhetorical gap; there may even obtain an ontological gap, for
Professor Smith is right that most of the ontologies that prevail in the
leading philosophy departments leave law without support or respect.
There obtains, however, no ontic gap: God has created us with our
human natures and God has legislated within us. Natural law is naturally
knowable, and practical reason is ours with which both to discover and
implement the natural law. That, at least, is the classical position, and
I'm sticking to it, though it should be added that frequently, for purposes
of persuading people of it today, a faithful translation from the
traditional terms will be necessary.90 There is only one way to serve God
and neighbor, and that is wittily, in the tangle of our minds.
This brings me to a final point. In answering the question about suit
against an unconsenting state, our Supreme Court eschewed a Denzinger
jurisprudence in favor of attention to history, practice, precedent, the
structure of the Constitution, and, yes, to text itself.9 It was through the
use of this sound procedure that, as I mentioned at the outset, the Court
reached the dubious conclusion that the fifty states enjoy "sovereign
dignity." Sovereignty and its cognates are Protean enough that they
perhaps have benign meanings, but history shows that most deployments
of sovereignty tend to stage an usurpation somewhere or other; the one
on whose behalf sovereignty is claimed is freed thereby from the
88. Steven D. Smith, Believing Like a Lawyer, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1041 (1999).
89. AVERY DULLES, THE ASSURANCE OF THINGS HOPED FOR 3 (1994).
90. One additional point merits inclusion here. Some natural lawyers, such as the
great Jesuit Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), have held that knowledge of the legislative
pedigree is necessary for the natural law to have the force of law. This presented no
problem of enforcement for Suarez, because he was of the view that the signum of the
divine legislator was fully evident in the promulgated law. The classical position of
Thomas, however, is that it is sufficient that the recipient of the natural law be able to
know the difference between moral good and evil, that is, that one is legislated to be done
and pursued and the other avoided, and then to move on toward particulars and the
prudent application of the natural law thereto. Thomas certainly thinks that we should be
able to reason from these facts about good and evil to the divine legislator, but for Thomas
it is not necessary for the agent to know the ultimate legislative point of origin. On
Suarez, see HIT-INGER, supra note 18, at 51-57, and JOHN E. COONS & PATRICK M.
BRENNAN, BY NATURE EQUAL: THE ANATOMY OF A WESTERN INSIGHT 129-32 (1999).
91. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 760 (1999).
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obligation to implement the natural law.9 Law is not text, and law of
human creation is not sovereign. The preeminent service of Steven
Smith's Law's Quandary, in my judgment, is its humbling if oblique
suggestion to those working in mainstream Anglo-American
jurisprudence that law of our making is the better the more it respects
the true sovereign's legislation. Our work in the law is always the non-
sovereign work of serving God wittily, in the tangle of our minds. We
owe Professor Smith a great debt of gratitude for helping us untangle our
minds a turn or two; the rest is up to us, wittily. In the words of More
with which he follows up those with which I began: "Our natural business
lies in escaping - so let's get home and study this Bill." 93
92. Jean Bodin often is identified as proposing a sovereign unlimited by even natural
law or the law of God; for a correction of this misreading of Bodin, see KENNETH
PENNINGTON, THE PRINCE AND THE LAW, 1200-1600, at 278 (1993).
93. BOLT, supra note 2, at 74.
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